Hugh Lacey (1939) é pesquisador emérito na Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, Estados Unidos, onde começou a lecionar em 1972. É Doutor em História e Filosofia da Ciência pela Universidade de Indiana (EUA), tendosido professor visitante na Universidade de São Paulo em diversas ocasiões (1973, 1996, 2000 e 2004). Seus trabalhos atribuem lugares próprios aos valores dentro da tecnociência, procurando mostrar que a abordagem científica materialista precisa assumir também o lugar que as coisas ocupam em sistemas ecológicos e sociais. (...) class='Hi'>Lacey é autor de diversos artigos e livros, entre os quais estão Valores e Atividade Científica 1, Valores e Atividade Científica 2, A Controvérsia sobre os transgênicos: questões científicas e éticas, entre outros. (shrink)

Epistemologies of the South explores “a set of inquiries into the construction and validation of knowledge born in struggle, of ways of knowing developed by social groups as part of their resistance against the systematic injustices and oppressions caused by capitalism, colonialism and patriarchy” . The author, Boaventura de Sousa Santos—Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra and Distinguished Legal Scholar at the University of Wisconsin–Madison—is one of the leading intellectuals of the World Social Forum , the network of (...) organizations from the “global South” that challenge the current dominant order, and whose activities are often informed by experiences, aspirations and understanding that lie outside of the comprehension of the world as provided by mainstream scientific, economic and social theories. Through the WSF, Santos has made profound contact with the knowledge, forms of knowledge , their strengths and limitations, and the practices infor .. (shrink)

A legitimação de políticas públicas que apóiam o cultivo de lavouras transgênicas em larga escala pressupõe, entre outras condições, (1) que os dados empíricos garantem não haver riscos ambientais não-administráveis e, (2) a não-existência de modos melhores de produzir alimentos sem a utilização de técnicas transgênicas. O artigo discute: (a) Os tipos de investigação científica necessários para um exame adequado da condição (1), (b) como as investigações sobre (1) e (2) se relacionam entre si, e (c) como tais investigações se (...) relacionam com valores sociais controvertidos. (shrink)

Legitimation of public policies that support the widespread plantings of transgenic crops presuppose, among other conditions, that evidence supports that there are no unmanageable environmental risks and there are no better ways to produce enough nourishing food that can dispense with the transgenics-oriented ways. This paper discusses: the kinds of scientific inquiry that are needed to address adequately, the connections between investigations of and , and how these investigations are related with controversial social values.A legitimação de políticas públicas que apóiam (...) o cultivo de lavouras transgênicas em larga escala pressupõe, entre outras condições, que os dados empíricos garantem não haver riscos ambientais não-administráveis e, a não-existência de modos melhores de produzir alimentos sem a utilização de técnicas transgênicas. O artigo discute: Os tipos de investigação científica necessários para um exame adequado da condição , como as investigações sobre e se relacionam entre si, e como tais investigações se relacionam com valores sociais controvertidos. (shrink)

O objetivo do artigo é o de extrair dos escritos de Taylor uma crítica da concepção de Kuhn a respeito de uma possível unidade entre as ciências naturais e as ciências humanas, e dos de Kuhn uma crítica à caracterização proposta por Taylor para as ciências naturais. Deste empreendimento resulta uma reconceptualização da unidade das ciências.

Exploring the role of values in scientific inquiry, Hugh Lacey examines the nature and meaning of values, and looks at challenges to the view, posed by postmodernists, feminists, radical ecologists, Third-World advocates and religious fundamentalists, that science is value free. He also focuses on discussions of 'development', especially in Third World countries. This paperback edition includes a new preface.

Critics have argued that behaviorism must necessarily be inadequate to account for complex human behavior whereas cognitive psychology is adequate to account for such behavior. Recently, Fodor has focused this criticism on certain situations in which humans choose among a set of alternatives. We argue that this criticism applies to forms of behaviorism that are reductionistic but not to non-reductionistic behaviorisms like that of Skinner. Non-reductionistic behaviorism can be used to interpret human choice situations of varying degrees of complexity. Such (...) interpretations run into difficulty in accounting for certain aspects of verbal behavior, but so do cognitive theories. Although nothing, in principle, prohibits either type of theory from accounting for complex human behavior, neither current behavioral theory nor current cognitive theory is developed enough at the present time to do so. (shrink)

I consider the questions, central to recent disagreements between Longino and Kitcher: Is it constitutive of making judgments of the cognitive acceptability of theories that they be made under certain social relations (that embody specific social values) that have been cultivated among investigators (Longino)? Or is making them (sound ones) just a consequence of social interactions that occur under these relations (Kitcher)? While generally endorsing the latter view, I make a distinction, not made by Longino, between sound acceptance and endorsement (...) of a theory, and argue that her view applies to endorsement. (shrink)

Cognitive values are the characteristics that are constitutive of good theories, the criteria to which we appeal when choosing among competing theories. I argue that, in order to count as a cognitive value, a characteristic must be needed to explain actually made theory choices, and its cognitive significance must be well defended especially in view of considerations derived from the objective of science. A number of proposed objectives of science are entertained, and it is argued that adopting a par-ticular objective (...) is dialectically intertwined with commitment to certain social values.Then, the ways in which science is, and is not value free is explored briefly, leading to the identification of a level of analysis where values may influence theory choice without causing paradox or threatening the impartiality of soundly-made scientific judgments. (shrink)

Technoscientific research, a kind of scientific research conducted within the decontextualized approach (DA), uses advanced technology to produce instruments, experimental objects, and new objects and structures, that enable us to gain knowledge of states of affairs of novel domains, especially knowledge about new possibilities of what we can do and make, with the horizons of practical, industrial, medical or military innovation, and economic growth and competition, never far removed from view. The legitimacy of technoscientific innovations can be appraised only in (...) the course of considering fully what sorts of objects technoscientific objects are: objects that embody scientific knowledge confirmed within DA; physical/chemical/biological objects, realizations of possibilities discovered in research conducted within DA, brought to realization by means of technical/experimental/instrumental interventions; and components of social/ecological systems, objects that embody the values of technological progress and (most of them) values of capital and the market. What technoscientific objects are - their powers, tendencies, sources of their being, effects on human beings and social/economic systems, how they differ from non technoscientific objects - cannot be grasped from technoscientific inquiry alone; scientific inquiry that is not reducible to that conducted within DA is also needed. The knowledge that underlies and explains the efficacy of technoscientific objects is never sufficient to grasp what sorts of object they are and could become. Science cannot be reduced to technoscience. (shrink)

In the current controversy about the value of transgenic crops, matters open to empirical inquiry are centrally at issue. One such matter is a key premise in a common argument (that I summarize) that transgenic crops should be considered to have universal value. The premise is that there are no alternative forms of agriculture available to enable the production of sufficient food to feed the world. The proponents of agroecology challenge it, claiming that agroecology provides an alternative, and they deny (...) the claim that it is well founded on empirical evidence. It is, therefore, a matter of both social and scientific importance that this premise and the criticisms of it be investigated rigorously and empirically, so that the benefits and disadvantages of transgenic-intensive agriculture and agroecology can be compared in a reliable way. Conducting adequate investigation about the potential contribution of agroecology requires that the cultural conditions of its practice (and, thus, of the practices and movements of small-scale farmers in the “third world”) be strengthened—and this puts the interests of investigation into tension with the socio-economic interests driving the development of transgenics. General issues about relationship between ethical argument and empirical (scientific) investigation are raised throughout the article. (shrink)

I distinguish three matters about which decisions have to be made in scientific activities: (1) adoption of strategy; (2) acceptance of data, hypotheses, and theories; and (3) application of scientific knowledge. I argue that, contrary to the common view that only concerning (3) do values have a legitimate role, value judgments often play indispensable roles in connection with decisions concerning (1)—that certain values may not only be furthered by applications of the scientific knowledge gained under a strategy, but they may (...) also provide a primary reason for conducting research under the strategy. However, this is compatible with making decisions concerning (2) that in no way draw upon values. While, in my opinion, this account applies to all the sciences, it has special salience in the behavioral and cognitive sciences. The behavioral scientist, qua scientist, makes value judgments when making decisions about which strategy to adopt, but not when deciding which theories to accept as providing knowledge and understanding of specified domains of phenomena. (shrink)

Suppose that one accepts a theory that proposes that a certain group’s holding of a false belief is co-caused by a specified social structure. Then, Bhaskar has argued, one is rationally committed, ceteris paribus, to adopting a negative value judgment of that structure and a positive value judgment of activity directed towards removing it . Contrary to Bhaskar, I argue that any rational move from accepting a theory to value judgments is mediated either by further value judgments, or by the (...) role played by value-impregnated theoretical terms. Furthermore, I argue , Bhaskar’s argument tends not to be applicable in the case of theories that assign certain kinds of causal roles to social structures. Reflection on Bhaskar’s argument, however, leads to a deeper grasp of the relations between accepting theories in the social sciences and adopting value judgments. (shrink)

We begin by a summary of the standardized version of the model of the interaction between scientific activities and values (elaborated fully in Lacey and Mariconda, 2015), and based on it we argue that there is a profound incoherence in the self- understanding of the modern scientific tradition, and that the main options actually available to ensure continuity with the positive realizations of this tradition can be well represented by two sorts of ideal types that we name, respectively,“commercially orientated (...) technoscience” and “multi-strategic research”. Then, in the light of the predominance that commercially oriented technoscience has gained in contemporary scientific institutions, we argue for the importance of developing multi-strategic research in areas such as agriculture. This is needed so that adequate evaluation of the potential risks of large scale applications of technoscience, as well as harm they may have actually occasioned, can be made; and also so that these applications can be rigorously compared with scientifically informed practices, such as agroecology, which are not as problematic for human health and the environment and which explore the regenerative powers of nature itself. (shrink)

Scientists make judgments of value all the time. They usually evaluate their theories according to “cognitive values” (empirical adequacy, power to make predictions, explanatory power etc). But a theory can also be evaluated according to non-cognitive values (social, political, economical, etc). Traditionally, cognitive and non-cognitive kinds of values are maintained separated from one another in order to protect science’s “autonomy”, impartiality”, and “neutrality”. However, social and moral values, as well as other kinds of non-cognitive values, play their role in science, (...) not only by addressing the ethical issues of scientific research, but also by establishing the strategies according to which the problems to be investigated are chosen, and practical applications are sought. Therefore, science is not “neutral”, nor properly “autonomous” - it is permeated by those non-cognitive values. But scientific research can and should be said “impartial” in relation to the cognitive evaluation of its results, in order to make the progress of the research possible, and to allow a diversity of values to make room for a variety of competing strategies. Key words: cognitive values, non-cognitive values, scientific research, strategies, impartiality. (shrink)

Their initial assumption, however, is mistaken. Augustine's worries were not linguistic ones, although to be fair to the recent critics his worries were exacerbated by some linguistic muddles. He knew perfectly well that he had no trouble talking about time. This he accepted as a fact. His problem was that, although he used temporal terms correctly very easily, he did not know to what they referred. He wanted to know whether time is a feature of the objective physical world, or (...) whether time is a subjective phenomenon; whether temporal relations are relations among physical events, or relations among private, mental events. Ordinary usage did not supply answers to these questions. Indeed, correct ordinary usage is compatible with temporal terms sometimes referring to features of the physical world, sometimes to subjective phenomena. He also wanted to know whether temporal discourse requires reference to specifically temporal entities, i.e., entities or moments which exist independently of things, or whether time is adequately accounted for in terms of the temporal relations among events; whether the measurement of time depends upon the measurement of specifically temporal objects, or whether it is accounted for in terms of features of physical processes. In the course of his inquiry Augustine repeatedly expressed bewilderment. This bewilderment is due not to his being unable to find other words to do the job of "time," but to the fact that the answers do not readily emerge from ordinary ways of talking about "time.". (shrink)

Appraising public policies about using technoscientific innovations requires attending to the values reflected in the interests expected to be served by them. It also requires addressing questions about the efficacy of using the innovations, and about whether or not using them may occasion harmful effects ; moreover, judgments about these matters should be soundly backed by empirical evidence. Clearly, then, scientists have an important role to play in formulating and appraising these public policies. However, ethical and social values affect decisions (...) made about the criteria for identifying the range of risks, and of relevant empirical data needed for making judgments about them, that should be considered in public policy deliberations, and for determining how well claims concerning risks should be supported by the available data in order to warrant that they have a decisive role in the deliberations. Consider the case of public policies about using GMOs. Concerning the range of data: is it sufficient for risk assessment only to be informed by data relevant to investigating the risks of using GMOs that may be occasioned by way of physical/chemical/biological mechanisms directly triggered by events within their modified genomes? Or: should data pertaining to the full range of ecological and socioeconomic effects of using them, in the environments in which they are used and under the socioeconomic conditions of their use, also inform this assessment? Those interested in producing and using GMOs, in the light of their adhering to values of capital and the market, are likely to give a positive answer to the first question; those holding competing values, e.g., connected with respect for human rights and environmental sustainability, to the second. And, concerning the degree of support: the former – citing the ethical gravity of losses that would be incurred by failing to use GMOs on a wide scale – are likely to require less stringent standards of evidential appraisal than the latter. Scientists, qua scientists, however, do not have special authority in the realm of values. Thus, their judgments, about the evidential support that claims about risks have, may sometimes be reasonably contested partly on value-laden grounds – as they have been in the GMO case, where the contestation has generated considerable controversy, and continues to do so. It follows that, in the context of deliberations about public policy, unless scientists engage with representatives of all stakeholders in the outcomes of the policies – taking into account that their competing values may lead to making different decisions about what are the relevant data, as well as about the degree of support required for their claims about risks to gain the required credibility to inform the deliberations; and respecting "tempered equality" of participants in the dialogue – their trustworthiness is put into question and their authority diminished. (shrink)

Most relational theories assert both that spatial discourse is reducible to talk about physical objects and their spatial relations, and that the relation of congruence derives from a non-metrical relation which intervals bear or possibly bear to measuring instruments. We have shown that there are serious logical difficulties involved in maintaining both these positions and the thesis of the continuity of space. We have also shown that Grünbaum's motivating argument for the reduction of congruence is unsound, and, moreover, that the (...) prospects of formulating the kind of definition which this reduction requires seem to rest upon a wholly vague notion of physical possibility. Alternatively, if congruence is taken as primitive, it seems plausible that spatial discourse can be reconstructed so that there is no ontological commitment to spatial objects other than physical objects. Whether or not this relational thesis is ultimately defensible requires more elaboration of the relational theory, and investigation of its role in the formalizations of current physical theories. It is odd, considering the wide currency of relational theories, that this work has never been done. (shrink)

Technoscientific objects are penetrating ever more profoundly into the socio-ecological systems that shape the contemporary lifeworld in ways that have brought about widely celebrated benefits, and also many kinds of risks for human health, the environment and society. There are many kinds of technoscientific objects, such as physical, chemical or biological objects that are outcomes of technical/experimental/instrumental interventions made in the course of research conducted in such areas as computer science, biotechnology, nanotechnology, neurosciences, geo-engineering, synthetic biology and artificial intelligence. Moreover, (...) every technoscientific object is itself an object of many kinds, not only an object whose genesis, functioning and effective use are well understood in areas like these, but also a social, economic, ecological and cultural object; and, for each kind that the object is, there are associated specific causal mechanisms whose operations, when triggered in the course of using it in the lifeworld, may lead to effects on and risks for human lives, social arrangements and the environment (Section 1). I will illustrate these claims as they apply to the exemplary technoscientific objects, transgenics (GMOs) used in agriculture (Section 2). Then (Section 3), generalizing the discussion about transgenics, I will argue that appraising the value and legitimacy of introducing and using technoscientific objects adequately requires being informed by the results of scientific investigation that take into account all the kinds of things that they are, and (to the extent possible) all the causal mechanisms from which the effects and risks of using them may arise. Keywords: Technoscientific objects, transgenics, ecological and social responsibility. (shrink)

I offer a view of the aims and responsibilities of science, and use it to analyze critically van Fraassen’s view that ‘objectifying inquiry’ is fundamental to the nature of science.

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A reasonable choice between Skinner's and Chomsky's theories requires reference to a conception of human nature. It is explained in detail why this is so, in the context of an analysis of what it is to ‘choose’ a theory. This account helps to explain the unity and coherence of the science, methodology, conception of science, object of scientific inquiry and views towards control of each of Skinner and Chomsky, and thereby explains the chasm which separates the parties to their respective (...) programs. The analysis given implies that, in a precise sense, the theory-choice is implicated in value-judgments. (shrink)

This book provides an accessible introduction to jurisprudence and legal theory. It sets out a course of study that offers a highly effective series of introductions into a wide variety of theories and theoretical perspectives, from traditional approaches such as Natural Law to modern ones such as Feminist Theory, Economic Analysis of Law and Foucault and Law, The book is designed for students of jurisprudence and legal theory, but it will also assist those studying law and legal systems within courses (...) on Political Science, Philosophy and Sociology. (shrink)

After precisely specifying the thesis of the causal theory of time, Grünbaum's program developed to support this thesis is examined. Four objections to his definition of temporal order in terms of a more primitive causal relation are put and held to be conclusive. Finally, the philosophical arguments that Grünbaum has proposed supporting the desirability of establishing a causal theory of time are shown to be either invalid or inconclusive.

IVF as lottery or investment: contesting metaphors in discourses of infertilityThis paper reports an aspect of a poststructural feminist study in which I explored the discursive formations within which women for whom in vitro fertilisation (IVF) was unsuccessful constitute themselves. In my exploration I draw on data from interviews with women who discontinued infertility treatment, print media material and infertility self‐help books. Specifically, I highlight a metaphor of lottery in discourses of infertility, arguing that it is hegemonic and showing how (...) when women are situated as gamblers, the metaphor is instrumental in polarising them into ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ in relation to the subjectivity of motherhood. I further deconstruct these subjectivities, showing how ‘winners’ are valorised and ‘losers’ are pathologised. But importantly, I show how infertile women who are not mothers resisted locating themselves as ‘losers’ in a metaphor of lottery and instead situated themselves in a contesting metaphor of investment as diligent ‘workers’ and as active agents in choosing the best employment of their bodily and monetary resources. This paper therefore amplifies the marginalised perspective of infertile women who are not mothers. (shrink)

Background: Studies have established that negative perceptions of people living with HIV/AIDS exist among nursing students throughout the world, perceptions which can be detrimental to the delivery of high-quality nursing care. Objectives: The purpose of this research was to explore socio-cultural influences on the perceptions of nursing students towards caring for people living with HIV/AIDS. Research design: The study was guided by stigma theory, a qualitative descriptive research approach was adopted. Data collected via semi-structured interviews were thematically analysed. Participants and (...) research context: Participants were 21 international and Australian undergraduate nursing students enrolled in a Bachelor of Nursing programme at an Australian university. Ethical considerations: Ethical approval was granted by the Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee at the study university. Participation was entirely voluntary; informed consent was obtained before the study commenced; confidentiality and anonymity were assured. Findings: Three major themes were found: blame, othering and values. Complex and interrelated factors constructed participant perceptions of people living with HIV/AIDS, perceptions underscored by the prevailing culturally construed blame and othering associated with HIV/AIDS. The study found discordance between the negative personal beliefs and perceptions some nursing students have towards people living with HIV/AIDS, and the professional values expected of them as Registered Nurses. Discussion: There was considerable commonality between this and previous studies on how homosexuality and illicit drug use were perceived and stigmatised, correlating with the blame directed towards people living with HIV/AIDS. These perceptions indicated some nursing students potentially risked not fulfilling the ethical and professional obligations the Registered Nurse. Conclusion: Nursing curriculum should be strengthened in relation to comprehending the meaning of being stigmatised by society. Educational institutions need to work towards enhancing strategies that assist nursing students to reconcile any incongruity between their personal beliefs and requisite professional nursing values. (shrink)

In this paper we comment on the changes in the provision of fertility care in Australia, New Zealand and the UK to illustrate how different funding arrangements of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) shape the delivery of patient care and the position of fertility nursing. We suggest that the routinisation of in vitro fertilisation technology has introduced a new way of managing the fertility patient at a distance, the distal fertility patient. This has resulted in new forms of organisational routines in (...) ART which challenge both traditional forms of nursing and advanced nursing roles. We discuss the consequences of this increasingly globalised approach to infertility through the lens of three national contexts, Australia, New Zealand and the UK to unpack the position of nursing within the new forms of organisational routines. (shrink)

Hugh H. Benson explores Plato's answer to Clitophon's challenge, the question of how one can acquire the knowledge Socrates argues is essential to human flourishing-knowledge we all seem to lack. Plato suggests two methods by which this knowledge may be gained: the first is learning from those who already have the knowledge one seeks, and the second is discovering the knowledge one seeks on one's own. The book begins with a brief look at some of the Socratic dialogues where (...) Plato appears to recommend the former approach while simultaneously indicating various difficulties in pursuing it. The remainder of the book focuses on Plato's recommendation in some of his most important and central dialogues-the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic-for carrying out the second approach: de novo inquiry. The book turns first to the famous paradox concerning the possibility of such an inquiry and explores Plato's apparent solution. Having defended the possibility of de novo inquiry as a response to Clitophon's challenge, Plato explains the method or procedure by which such inquiry is to be carried out. The book defends the controversial thesis that the method of hypothesis, as described and practiced in the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic, is, when practiced correctly, Plato's recommended method of acquiring on one's own the essential knowledge we lack. The method of hypothesis when practiced correctly is, then, Platonic dialectic, and this is Plato's response to Clitophon's challenge. (shrink)